Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects women from sex discrimination, while the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination against workers over the age of 40. Since an older woman may be subject to discrimination in the workplace based on both age and sex, legal scholars argue that age and sex discrimination laws must be used jointly to protect the older-woman minority group. However, courts do not always use them together in practice and do not necessarily give older women protection based on membership in both protected classes. This implies that age discrimination laws alone may be not as effective, or may be even ineffective in protecting older women compared to older men. I test this implication by estimating the differential effect of age discrimination laws on labor market outcomes between women and men. The findings show that age discrimination laws do far less to improve labor market outcomes for older women than for older men, which supports the argument that older women need to be classified as a subgroup of two protected classes to receive adequate protection.
Introduction
Previous economic studies have examined various forms of illegal discrimination such as race, sex, age, and disability and estimated the effects of antidiscrimination laws on protecting workers against these types of discrimination. This paper analyzes how effective U.S. antidiscrimination laws are in protecting older women against a unique type of discrimination they may experience in the workplace.
Older women may be discriminated against based on: (i) age (being old compared to young); (ii) sex (being female compared to male); and (iii) both age and sex (being old and female compared to young and male). The last type of discrimination, based on membership in both protected classes, is known as intersectional discrimination.
The two key federal antidiscrimination laws that protect workers against discrimination in employment practices such as hiring, discharge, promotions, and compensation are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
1 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin and the ADEA prohibits discrimination against workers over age 40. 2 To provide adequate protection for older women who may be faced with intersectional discrimination, legal scholars argue that the laws protecting each of the two classes (in this case sex and age) must be used jointly, recognizing older women as a subgroup of two protected classes (Porter, 2003; Crocette, 1998) . However, for various reasons, courts do not always allow older women to bring their unique discrimination claims as intersectional discrimination cases in practice. 3 This has an importation implication about the antidiscrimination system in the U.S. and may suggest that the ADEA alone may be ineffective or not as effective in protecting older women compared to older men against age discrimination in the workplace.
The purpose of this study is to test this hypothesis by estimating the differential effect of age discrimination laws between older men's and older women's various labor market outcomes as well as the overall effect of age discrimination laws on older women's. Previous studies have shown that age discrimination laws have been effective at protecting older workers, but these studies have restricted their analysis to male workers (Neumark and Stock, 1999; Adams, 2004) . Therefore, studying the differential effect of age discrimination laws on older men's and older women's labor market outcomes closes the gap in this literature.
The importance of recognizing older women as a subgroup is well shown in the following simple example. In a workforce that consists of five old women, five young women, five old men, and five young men where the company discharges three old women and one from each of the remaining three groups. If this case were to be viewed as an intersectional discrimination claim, the statistical evidence would indicate that the probability of being discharged for older women is estimated to be 40 percentage points higher than for the other groups (i.e. young women, old men, or young men). However, if this claim were to be viewed solely as either sex or age discrimination, the estimated probability of being discharged for older women is only 20 percentage points higher than for men or all young employees, which substantially reduces the strength of evidence.
Existing literature from various fields suggests to pervasive age discrimination or intersectional discrimination against older women in the labor market. In general, it is hard to detect evidence of age or age-sex discrimination because simple age or age-sex differences do not necessarily indicate discrimination, but rather reflect correlated unobserved productivity. Implementing a field experiment such as a correspondence study is also challenging in studying age discrimination because age-related differences in job experience between younger and older workers makes it exceedingly difficult to disentangle these two effects. 4 Simply, it is inherently impossible to generate fictional resumes that look similar between older and younger job applicants. In a recent large-scale field experiment, though, Neumark et al. (2015) addressed this issue by defining older applicants as having the same experience as younger applicant as well as defining older applicants having experience commensurate with their age within the same experiment. They found robust evidence of age discrimination in hiring against older women, whereas they found considerably less evidence for older men. 5 In a similar research design, Lahey (2008) also found evidence that is consistent with age discrimination in hiring for women. Lahey restricted her sample to women, as time out of the labor force for women is less likely to be a negative signal of unobserved productivity than for men.
There is enough evidence across various fields of study that supports unfavorable labor market outcomes for older women that may coincide with older women's intersectional discrimination.
Economists have empirically found a premium associated with appearance (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Hamermesh, 1998, Hamermesh and Parker, 2005) . 6 Moreover, studies have found appearance is more valued in women, age and attractiveness are negatively correlated, and the perception of decline in attractiveness with age is more prominent for women (Korthase and Trenholme, 1982; Henss, 1991; Bazzini et al, 1997; Berman, O'Nan and Floyd, 1981) . These studies collectively suggest older women may be subject to intersectional discrimination in the workplace for being both old and female.
My analysis exploits variations in both state and federal age discrimination laws using Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1963 to 1969 and estimate the differential effect of age discrimination laws on employment, retirement, unemployment probability between men and women. This allows me to compare how effective these laws are in improving labor market outcomes for older women compared to older men. I also estimate the overall effect of age discrimination laws on older women. One main concern in this strategy is that older women may voluntarily leave the workforce more than older men. If 5 Neumark et al. not only address the potential bias towards finding age discrimination, but also the issues involving differences in the variances of the unobservables.
6 Although these studies did not disentangle whether the preferable labor market outcomes for more attractive workers was due to productivity or discrimination, they all clearly showed more attractive workers have higher earnings.
older men, who are more likely to be married to older women, can stay in the work force longer due to age discrimination laws, then older women who are often secondary earners within the household may choose to leave the labor force earlier. Although it is difficult to fully disentangle this effect of voluntary labor force exit from discrimination, I attempt to address this issue by restricting the women's sample to single women. 7 My results indicate that age discrimination laws did far less to improve both employment and retirement for older women than for older men. In some cases, I find no evidence that age discrimination is has boosted the labor market outcomes for older women. These results were robust to restricting the sample to single women. My findings support the legal scholars' argument that to provide adequate protection for older women, the laws must consider older women as a subgroup of protected classes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some relevant legal cases that show the inconsistency in classification of older women in courts. Section 3 describes the research design, data, and empirical models used in this analysis. Section 4 presents results, and section 5 concludes by discussing some implications of this study.
Intersectional Discrimination and Court Decisions
The decisions and opinions on intersectional discrimination cases involving sex and age are mixed. One main distinction between intersectional discrimination based on age and sex (i.e., discrimination against older women) compared to intersectional discrimination based on race and sex (i.e., discrimination against black women) is that the discrimination against older women may be more
16 is a good example where employer claims that "youthful appearance" is a bona fide occupational qualification for the anchorwoman position, and an attractive young anchorwoman establishes a "business necessity" justification.
Research Design, Data, and Estimation Approach

Research Design and Data
This study relies on two identification strategies to test whether age discrimination laws are effective in improving labor market outcomes for older women and how these effect are different between Cir. 1985) older men and older women. The first identification strategy uses variations in state-level age discrimination laws across states in 1965 and the second identification uses the enactment of the federal ADEA in 1967. I refer to the first identification strategy as state experiment and the second one as federal experiment. The variations in age discrimination laws, either by the state laws or the federal laws allow me to implement a quasi-experimental design to estimate the causal effect of age discrimination laws.
Since the federal experiment exploits the age discrimination implemented at the federal level, the main advantage of adopting two different identifications strategies is that comparison of two results allows me to address the policy endogeneity issues that may be related to using changes in state-level age discrimination laws, which I discuss more later.
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I use CPS from 1963 to 1969, which corresponds to the period during which there is substantial variations in state age discrimination laws. I merge the CPS data with the state age discrimination laws used in Neumark and Stock (1999) and Adams (2004) . Another fact that is noteworthy about this period is that none of the courts had recognized intersectional discrimination during these years. This means that none of the older women were categorized as a subgroup in any age discrimination or intersectional discrimination law suits. 
Empirical Model
To test whether the age discrimination law alone adequately protects older women who may be subject to intersectional discrimination in the workplace, I estimate linear probability models for employment, retirement, and unemployment for both men and women and how the effects of age discrimination laws on these labor market outcomes for women differ compared to men. Using the variations in state age discrimination laws, the enactment of the ADEA, and the expansion of age limitation, I implement the following difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model:
where Yist is a labor market outcome of interest for individual i in state s at time t. LAWst is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is in a state that has an age discrimination law in effect and PTDist is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is within an age group protected by age discrimination laws. Ss is a vector of state dummy variables, Tt is a vector of year dummy variables and Aist is a vector of age group dummy variables denoting different age groups. 19 The year dummy variables control for yearspecific shocks common to all states in any given year, and state dummy variables control for timeinvariant state-specific differences, and age group dummy variable control for any difference in age. Xist is a vector of individual level demographic controls that includes Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) status, marital status, and education level. The SMSA status is a vector of dummy variables indicating whether an individual lives in a central city, boundary, or non-metropolitan area. The marital status is a set of dummy variables for separated or divorced, never married, and widowed. The education level is a set of dummy variables for high school, some college, and college.
The identification regarding the DDD estimator is compelling because the specification includes a full set of interaction of state and age dummy variables, state and year dummy variables, and age and year dummy variables. These control for unobserved shocks to outcomes that coincide with the adoption of age discrimination laws that affect labor market outcomes. The age-state interactions (Aist⋅Ss) control for any arbitrary changes for each age group by state, and age-year interactions (Aist⋅Tt) remove biases common to all workers of a particular age in a given year. Adding state-year interactions (Ss⋅Tt) addresses the concern of biases that arise from any economic shocks that are specific to each state over time (i.e., time-varying factors). This flexible model captures the net impact of age discrimination laws on older workers, differencing out changes in labor market outcomes among older workers in states with and without laws and similar changes for younger worker in these states. With this specification, our DDD estimator, β captures the effect of the age discrimination laws.
To estimate the differential effect of laws between older women and older men, I modify equation
(1) to embed the sex difference. I augment equation (1) 
The main coefficient of interest is β1 ' , which estimates the differential effect of age discrimination laws on dependent variables between older men and older women. However, I am also interested in β2 ' , which captures the effect of age discrimination laws on older men. If the age discrimination laws boost the employment of older male workers as it is established in the existing literature, β2 ' should be positive and significant. If the age discrimination law is not as effective in protecting older women as older men, then β1 ' should be negative and significant. β1 ' +β2 ' indicate the overall effect of age discrimination laws on older women's labor market outcomes. For retirement and unemployment the signs of these estimates should be opposite to yield similar interpretation. In all my specifications, I cluster the standard errors at the state level .
Finally, I want to note a couple of caveats to this empirical strategy. The measure of age discrimination laws used simply depends whether the state has an age discrimination law or not at time t.
I do not consider any specific features of the law such as firm size covered, strength of damages allowed for the plaintiff, statute of limitations, recoverability of attorney's fees, or presence of enforcement agency. 21 The sample period used begins in 1963 and it is rather challenging to correctly cull all the histories of specific features for each state age discrimination laws going all the way to the 1960s.
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Although one may view this as a limitation of using historical legal data, I believe using variation in existence of age discrimination provides an important source of exogenous shock in the labor market for older workers. Another caveat is using younger workers as a second control group. One may be concerned that age discrimination laws also affect younger workers in which case younger workers may not be a valid control group. Based on my knowledge, there is no evidence that age discrimination laws affect younger workers. More importantly, the main focus of this study is to estimate the relative difference in the effect of age discrimination laws on older women compared to older men because older women may be subject to intersectional discrimination. Thus, this issue is not a main concern for my analysis in estimating the relative difference between men and women. I would argue that it is more important to fully control for any arbitrary changes in the dependent variables, which can be only done by using younger workers as an additional control group. It is important to keep in mind the advantage of 21 Neumark and Song (2013) uses these specific features of state age discrimination laws to study the complementary between Social Security reforms and age discrimination laws using more recent period. 22 The history of these laws in legal database such as Lexis Nexis or Westlaw often do not cover the period before the 1990s.
having additional control group that allows me to include full set of age by year, age by state, and state by year interactions that fully controls for any arbitrary changes in non-parametric way.
Results
Preliminary results
I first present the difference-in-differences (DD) estimates in Table 2 from a model that is much more parsimonious than equation (1) or (2). This specification includes individual characteristics, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects that controls for any time invariant unobserved state characteristics and aggregate yearly shocks. Although this specification cannot fully control for any time varying age or state specific shocks, examining DD estimator is still useful because it tells us about the effect of age discrimination laws without using younger age group as second control group. Since DD estimator cannot fully control for any changes in dependent variable at the state or age group over time, the important identification assumption for DD estimator is that there is no state specific time trend or age specific time trend. If there is any state or age group specific underlying trend, then DD estimate would be biased. With this caveat in mind, Table 2 reports the effect of age discrimination laws on employment, retirement, and unemployment by older men and older women, and the differential effect between older men and older women. Each column of each panel reports estimates from a separate linear probability model and the dependent variable is indicated on the top. The first row in each panel reports the effect of age discrimination laws on each outcome for men (i.e., analogous to 2 ′ from equation (2)), the overall effect of age discrimination law for women (i.e., analogous to 1 ′ + 2 ′ from equation (2)) and the differential effect of age discrimination law between men and women (i.e., analogous to 1 ′ from equation (2) The results from state experiment indicate that age discrimination in fact decreased employment probability for older women and this differential effect is statistically significant at the five percent level.
For men, the retirement probability decreased, helping older men to stay in labor force longer, but there is no such evidence found for women. Similarly, age discrimination increases the unemployment probability for women, but not for men. Under federal experiment, I find that age discrimination laws increase the employment probability for both older men and older women and I do not find any differential effect between older men and older women. Although finding in DD estimates does not point in one direction, the estimates indicate that the effect of age discrimination laws on older men and older women are different and there is no strong evidence that older women benefited from age discrimination laws. Table 3 , I present the preferred compelling DDD estimates in equation (2) that fully controls for any unobserved shocks to labor market outcomes for each age group over time and for each state over time. As discussed previously, this flexible DDD specification is more compelling than DD estimator because it controls for unobserved changes such as state time trend, which may be an issue with DD estimator. As before, the regressions control for detailed individual level characteristics that are included in summary statistics in Table 1 . The format of Table 3 is similar to the previous table. I report the effect of age discrimination law on each outcome for men (i.e., β₂′ from equation (2)), the overall effect of age discrimination law for women (i.e., β₁′+β₂′ from equation (2)) and the differential effect of age discrimination law between men and women (i.e., β₁′ from equation (2)).
Main results
Next in
The overall result of Table 3 is much stronger and consistent than the DD estimates reported in Table 2 . It points to a positive effect for all men in the protected age groups, but that is not necessarily true for all women in the protected age groups. In some cases, there is no evidence that age discrimination laws improved the labor market outcomes for women. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that state age discrimination laws increased the probability of being employed by 9.5 percentage points for all men in the protected age group, but it indicates that effect is 4.3 percentage points lower for women compared to men. 23 This estimate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The overall effect of the age discrimination law for women shows that the state age discrimination law boosted the employment probability of older women by only 5.2 percentage points, which is found to be statistically significant.
The magnitudes of estimates are almost identical under the federal experiment. However, the differential effect of 5.2 between men and women is only marginally significant at the 10.7 percent level. As explained in the previous section, significance of robust finding under federal experiment is that it addresses any potential policy endogeneity bias associated with enactment of state age discrimination laws. The federal experiment uses the enactment of federal ADEA, which is implemented at the federal level. Therefore, there is no concern that these laws are implemented as a response to changes for labor market outcomes of older workers. Column 2 of Table 3 reports the effect of age discrimination laws on retirement for men and women. Under the state experiment, I find that the state age discrimination laws lowered the probability of being retired by 8.8 percentage points for all protected men, whereas it decreased by only 0.8 percentage points for all protected women. The differential effect of 8.0 percentage points between men and women is found to be statistically significant. Similar results hold under the federal experiments except there is no evidence that the laws have any impact on retirement for women.
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the unemployment regression results. As a reminder, I follow the conventional definition of unemployment where I drop the respondents who are not in the labor force.
Under the state experiment, I do not find any evidence that age discrimination laws had any effect on unemployment for both men and women. However, my results indicate that the age discrimination increased the probability of being unemployed for women by 1.0 percentage point.
Is the differential effect due to voluntary labor force exit?
My main results suggest that the age discrimination laws were much less effective in improving labor market outcomes for older women compared to older men. As discussed in the previous section, one possible alternative interpretation for this differential effect may be that older women may voluntarily leave the labor force more than older men. If labor supply decisions are made at the household level and the age discrimination laws improved the labor market outcomes for older men, then older women who are often secondary earners within the household may choose to leave the labor force earlier. Although it is challenging to fully disentangle the effect of voluntary departure from the age discrimination in the workplace, I attempt to address this concern by restricting the sample to unmarried individuals. The assumption is that unmarried individuals do not make joint labor supply decisions so age discrimination laws do not induce voluntary labor force exit. Table 4 reports the estimates on the subsample of unmarried individuals. In general, findings are robust and in some cases, results are even stronger. The probability of being employed increased by 16 percentage points for older men, but this effect is still smaller for older women by 6.9 percentage points. Under the state experiment, this differential effect is found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For retirement, the laws decreased the probability of being retired by 3.6 to 7.7 percentage points for older men, but did not have any effect for older women. One interesting new finding is that the state laws lowered the probability of being unemployed for older men by 4.1 percentage point, but did not have any effect for older women.
Differential effect by age
I also examine the variant of equation (2) that separates the effect of age discrimination laws into different age groups specified in Table 5 . The estimates in Table 5 indicate that the effects of the age discrimination laws are more pronounced for older age groups for both men and women and the differential effect between older men and older women is also more pronounced for older age groups.
Column 1 of Table 5 in the top panel shows all protected males age 50 or above benefit from a 11.2 percentage point increase in employment probability, whereas protected males age 60 or above enjoyed an increase of 14.9 percentage points after enactment of state age discrimination laws. The overall effect of the legislation for older women shows all protected older women age 50 or above benefit only a 6.2 point increase in employment probability, which is 5.0 percentage points lower than older men. For older women age 60 or older, the probability is 6.4 percentage points lower than older men age 60 or older. The results are similar under the federal experiment. The probability of being employed for older women age 50 or older was 5.3 percentage points, but it is lower by 5.5 percentage points. 24 These estimates are statistically significant. It means that the differential effect between older women and older men is more pronounced for the older group of workers. Column 2 of Table 5 report results for retirement. Again, the differential effect of age discrimination laws on retirement between older men and older women are more pronounced for the older age groups. After state age discrimination laws were enacted the probability of being retired for older women is higher for both age 50 or older and age 60 or older women by 12.3 and 16.9 percentage points compared to older men, resulting in an overall decrease of retirement by 1.1 and 1.4 percentage points after state age discrimination laws were enacted. The estimates are similar under federal experiment, but there is no evidence that the ADEA decreased the retirement of age 50 or older women. However, the estimate is marginally significant for age 60 or older women. Table 6 reports the same separate effect of age discrimination laws by age group on subsample of single individuals. Results are very similar to Table 5 under state experiment that the effects of laws on employment and retirement are more pronounced for the older age groups. However, the general pattern in Table 5 cannot be found under the federal experiment. Although this may indicate some concerns for capturing the effect of voluntary labor force exit, it can also be argued that unmarried individuals during this sample period are not representative sample.
Falsification analysis
As a falsification analysis, I only include young workers in the analysis and I pretend that the age discrimination laws cover the ones who are age 30 or older instead of the actual covered age by the laws.
Obviously, in these specifications, age discrimination laws should not have any effect on employment, retirement, or unemployment for these age groups because they are not covered by the age groups. Table   7 presents this falsification analysis. Table 7 shows that there is no evidence suggesting that both statelevel and federal-level variations in age discrimination laws had any effects on employment, retirement, or unemployment for younger workers. I report the estimates for ones who are not married because labor market outcomes to avoid issues related to joint-decision on employment or unemployment. My main results reported in Table 3 indicate that the age discrimination laws boosted the employment and lowered the retirement of older workers and the differential effects between men and women were significant.
However, none of the estimates are statistically significant and this is true under both state and federal experiments. These estimates are as precise as the main results using full-sample in Tables 3.
Effects on black men, intersectional discrimination against race and age
The argument about older women's intersectional discrimination is not limited to discrimination against sex and age, but extended to any individual within two or more protected group. This motivates me to extend my analysis to black men who may be subject to discrimination for being black and old. Table 8 presents differential effects of age discrimination laws on employment, retirement, and unemployment between white men and black men. To isolate the effect of race from sex, I restrict the sample to males in this analysis. The effects on white men are almost identical to our main results across all three outcomes. However, I do not find any evidence that the age discrimination laws improved the labor market outcomes for black men, although the differential effect between black men and white men are not statistically different. There is no clear evidence in the existing literature that explains why old black men may be more discriminated against than old white men and this may be the reason why the results are weaker than the case for older women.
Concluding Remarks
The motivation of this study has been the legal argument that older women, who are subject to intersectional discrimination for being both old and female, may need to be considered as a subgroup of two protected classes to have adequate protection against discrimination in the workplace. Since courts do not always recognize them as a subgroup in legal cases, the implication is that age discrimination laws may not provide adequate protection for older women.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate the differential effect of the age discrimination laws between men and women. The evidence in this paper indicates both state age discrimination laws and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act improved the labor market outcomes for older men, but had a far less favorable effect on older women. In some cases, I find that age discrimination laws did not improve the labor market outcomes for older women at all. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that older women need to be considered as a subgroup of two protected classes to have adequate protection against intersectional discrimination. To address the concern that older women may voluntarily leave the labor force under the second earners model, which is not correlated with discrimination in the workplace, I re-analyzed the estimation by further restricting the women's sample to single women. I find consistent differential and less favorable effects of age discrimination laws on older women compared to older men.
Given this evidence, it seems reasonable to support the argument for classifying older women as a subgroup of two protected classes and treating their cases as intersectional discrimination. This would close a loophole in the U.S. legal system that may allow discrimination against a subset of women or similarly a subset of older workers in the workplace. , and * indicate that the estimates are statistically significant at the one-, five-, or ten-percent level. The specifications in DD model do not include interaction terms between age and year, state and year, and age and state. All estimates are weighted to be nationally representative. The binary dependent variable employment is equal to one if an individual is employed and binary dependent variable retirement is equal to one if an individual is retired at the time of survey. All specifications include individual level controls such as SMSA, marital status, and education level, age group dummy variables, state, year fixed effects, the female dummy variable as well as interactions between the female dummy variable and all the controls variables included in the model. The state experiment covers years between 1964 and 1967. Under the state experiment, treatment states are Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, and North Dakota, and their state age discrimination laws were enacted in 1965. Therefore, I treat the state age discrimination laws to be in effect after 1965. The federal experiment covers years between 1966 and 1971. Under federal experiment, treatment states are the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, and Texas and the federal ADEA was enacted in 1967. However, the ADEA was not in effect until 180 days after December 15, 1967 and the CPS interviews were conducted in March of each year. Therefore, I treat the ADEA to be in effect after 1969. The sample is restricted to individuals who are older than 40 years old and 70 years old or younger. Table 2 apply. The sample is restricted to individuals who are older than 18 years old and 70 years old or younger and the specification includes interactions between age and state, age and year, and state and year fixed effect. (2) and the sample is restricted to individuals who are not married. (2) and the sample is restricted to individuals who are between age 18 or older and 40 or younger, and not married. I pretend the age discrimination laws to cover the ones who are age 30 or older instead of real covered age by the law. 
